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DAY 1 - 1st September 05
START |
END |
TOPIC |
COMPANY |
| 08:00 |
08:30 |
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| 08:30 |
08:45 |
Welcome and Keynote Speech
by Dr. Thaweesak Koanantakool
Director
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National Electronic and Computer Technology Center - Thailand |
| 08:45 |
09:15 |
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Microsoft |
| 09:15 |
10:15 |
Security Tools Integration Framework: Automating Distributed Hacking
Coordinated Network Intrusions is not an easy thing to handle. Automated Coordinated Network Intrusions could be even greater mess. A tool-human gluing framework, STIF, has evolved and developed into a coordinated intrusion intelligence management system. Now to be released with further enriched functionality, data publishing interface (including SQL, plain text, and TCP/IP socket interfaces) , multiple user interfaces (including web front-end and an IRC bot), pluggable architecture (plug and play your favorite tools ;)). |
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Fyodor Yarochkin and Meder Kydyraliev
oOo |
| 10:15 |
10:30 |
Coffee Break
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| 10:30 |
11:30 |
Auditing Unix Kernel Code
Major Malfunction spends a lot of time travelling. Consequently he spends a lot of time in Hotels. Hotels have Pay-Per-View. Hotels have infra-red remote controlled TVs. And so, to while away the hours, MMIrDA was born...Infra Red is all around us. Most of us will use an Infra Red controller on more or less a daily basis, to change the TV channel, or open a car or garage door, but how often have you thought about how it actually works?
This talk will describe not only how to analyse the signals being sent by your remote, but also how to use that information to find hidden commands and reveal functions you didn't even know your systems had. You will learn how to brute force garage doors, car doors, hotel pay-per-view TV systems, take over LED signs, vending machines and even control alarm systems, using cheap or home made devices and free software. |
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Ilja van Sprundel
Suresec.org |
| 11:30 |
12:00 |
Lunch |
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| 13:00 |
14:00 |
Social Enginerring Fundamentals
You might say there are two specialties within the job classification of con artist. Somebody who swindles and cheats people out of their money belongs to one sub-specialty, the grifter. Somebody who uses deception, influence, and persuasion against businesses, usually targeting their information, belongs to the other sub-specialty, the social engineer." -Kevin Mitnik
In today's world confidence scams present quite possibly the highest threat to security with in the business world. Control of information, withholding and leaking, can lead to massive failures and losses depending on how skilled the attacker may be. In combination with disinformation and propaganda, social engineering can as fatal as or even lead to loss of customer and shareholder confidence. |
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DAve Mckay and Anthony Zboralski |
| 14:00 |
15:00 |
iSCSI Security; Insecure SCSI
iSCSI is insecure. SCSI calls have traditionally been used from an IDE hard drive to the motherboard (the grey ribbon inside your computer). iSCSI takes all the benefits of SCSI and the connectivity of IP to provide large volumes of storage dynamically to any machine, any time, over any IP network. While iSCSI brings a tremendous amount of connectivity benefits, it simply has ignored security. Any protocol or product that controls large volumes of critical data should strongly support the core principles of security, including authentication, authorization, and availability. Unfortunately iSCSI does not support these aspects very well nor does it enable many of these principles by default. Furthermore, vendors like Microsoft, Cisco, NetApp, and EMC are pushing iSCSI into the market, but are failing to address the security issues that their customers will face.
The iSCSI Security presentation will contain three specific sections to educate users about the drastic security problems that are being overlooked with iSCSI storage. The presentation will include an Introduction/Protocol Overview, a description and demonstration of iSCSI Attacks, information on the iSCSI Defenses for each attack identified, and a short Conclusion. The presenter will described the security weaknesses, issues, and exploits concerning authentication and authorization and will follow-up each discussion with a demonstration of the actual attack. iSCSI attacks will show how 300 gigabytes of data can be compromised over the IP network without a single username of password. The attack demonstration will show how application and operating system security is important, but should not overshadow storage devices. The demonstration will also show that a compromise of a storage device can be equal to compromising 10 to 20 applications and/or operating systems combined, both of which are accessible over the IP network. |
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Himanshu Dwivedi iSecPartners |
| 15:00 |
15:30 |
Coffee Break |
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| 15:30 |
16:30 |
Speaking freely: the security and privacy challenges of modern communications
| The telecommunications landscape is undergoing multiple revolutions, from analog to digital, from simple mobility to complex roaming, from TDM to VoIP, from centralized to distributed, from proprietary systems to open standards and more importantly, from a closed environment to an increasingly interconnected world. Those changes are creating new security challenges, and the battle between privacy advocates and law enforcement is far from being over. As legal interception techniques become more ubiquitous, solutions to counter them such as cryptography and distributed non-standard protocols, are increasing in popularity. Similarly, hacking techniques and countermeasures for the new communications protocols such as VoIP, 3G/4G, IMS, WiMAX and others, are gaining in complexity and are becoming a growing concerns for authorities, operators and subscribers alike." |
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Emmanuel Gadaix - Telecom Security Task Force The Grugq
Telecom Security Task Force |
| 16:30 |
17:30 |
Infecting the Mach-o Object Format
| This talk aims to dispel the myths surrounding Mac OSX regarding it's ability to stand up to viruses and malicious code. The talk would begin with an introduction to ppc architecture, showing a few basic assembly instructions, then go into an overview of the mach-o format. Following this i would run through a few methods of infecting mach-o files which i have worked on recently, showing C based proof of concepts for these. I would also look at hooking functions and stealing arguments and some mach-o specific anti debug method. Finally i would finish up with a conclusion about the likelihood of infection on OSX showing possible attack vectors etc. |
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Neil Archibald
Suresec.org |
| 17:30 |
18:30 |
HoneyPot Forensic
| In the world of intrusion detection, intrusion prevention and hacker research honeypots are a quite a new and interesting technology. But only few know there is more to achieve with honeypots than just catch an intruders attention. Honeypots could reward you with versatile results and this presentation will be interesting to you even if you are familiar with deploying IDS/IPS/Honeypot systems. We will give an overview of the existing tools and provide you with a methodology to start your own forensic examinations. |
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Krisztian Piller and Sebastian Wolfgarten |
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End of Day 1 |
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DAY 2 - 2nd September 05
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